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This paper advances the notion of civil non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
Using Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire as cases studies, the paper identifies three 
kinds of civil non-state actors in war-torn countries: international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), community-based NGOs, and ad hoc community organizations. In 
addition, it argues that civil non-state actors play a critical problem-solving role in peace-
keeping and peacebuilding and complement the role of state actors. The paper examines 
the role of civil non-state actors through their dialectical affinity with state actors in the 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. It further expands the notion of non-state 
actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding to encompass community-based NGOs and ad 
hoc community organizations. Moreover, it points to the positive role of civil non-state 
actors and the wide range of activities they perform, especially in peace mediation and post-
war reconstruction.
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Introduction
International peacekeeping has largely been associated with states, most 
notably the major world powers and regional powers.1 This perception of 
international peacekeeping as being primarily a state action stems from the 
fact that the legal and military actions that underpin peacekeeping opera-
tions are undertaken by states – either unilaterally, as part of a coalition, or 
through intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN), 
the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By the very 
nature of civil wars, clear categories of involvement (government forces, 
armed opposition, mercenaries, foreign troops, perpetrators of war crimes, 
victims, multinational corporations, etc.) emerge in the course of the vio-
lence.2 While each of the categories can be lumped into what is generally 
referred to as state actors, non-state actors and victims, such a distinction 
does not provide sufficient clarity for examining the peacekeeping dimen-
sion of civil wars. Peacekeeping and its concomitant peacebuilding process 
involve many actors whose roles are often not well-defined. Such actors 
include not only states and intergovernmental organizations, but also non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), statesmen, and community and 
national leaders, who seek to alleviate humanitarian crisis, end the fighting, 
peacefully resolve the conflict, or address the root causes of war.3 This 
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patchwork of actors produces the bifurcated categories of state and non-
state actors in peacekeeping and its associated peacebuilding process. 
While the category of state actors refers to states and intergovernmental 
organizations, the category of non-state actors tends to be a generalization 
for international NGOs and civil society.
Though the category of non-state actors is loose, it is often juxtaposed 
with the category of state actors in both the broader literature on security 
and the specialized works on peacekeeping and peacebuilding.4 This 
dichotomy between state actors and non-state actors raises important 
questions in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. What consti-
tutes non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding and what role do 
they play? How do state actors and non-state actors complement one 
another? What impacts do non-state actors have on peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding? While the role of state actors and their positions are often 
specified in the relevant resolutions and official policies that define peace 
operations’ mandates, the roles of non-state actors tend to be ad hoc and 
constantly adapting to the pace of conflict and the deficit of appropriate 
state action. By addressing these questions, the study not only conceptual-
izes the notions of non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuiding, but 
also shows the range of non-state actors, the activities they perform, and 
how they can be better integrated into peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
processes and maximize their potential positive contributions.
In this study, non-state actors involved in peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing are referred to as civil non-state actors. The study argues that civil 
non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in contrast to other 
non-state actors, are domestic and global civil society bodies that play criti-
cal problem-solving roles at the local and national levels to advance human 
security and human development in war-torn countries. Moreover, the 
study argues that civil non-state actors complement the work of state actors 
by providing critical links to local actors and delivering vital services to 
war-affected populations without which state actors could not accomplish 
their missions. However, this complementarity is shaped by a dialectical 
tension between state actors and civil non-state actors that is rooted in 
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their different sources of power, nuanced understandings of core security 
and human rights values, and divergent interests. Though state and civil 
non-state actors are fundamentally different, they often share enough com-
mon interests to make them partners in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
Consequently, international peacekeeping has become an arena where 
states and civil non-state actors work along one another to promote shared 
security and humanitarian values, while maintaining their distinctive iden-
tity and moral boundaries. Furthermore, this complementarity simultane-
ously advances humanitarianism’s goal of enhancing human security and 
human development and reinforces the dominance of a Northern agenda 
and the associated neo-imperialist liberal peace model.5
This article is based on research conducted at the UN in New York and in 
West Africa as part of a broader research project on international state-
building in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire.6 In 2005, I conducted 
research at the UN Library and interviewed thirteen respondents working 
at the UN in New York. In 2008, I conducted field research in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. I interviewed twenty-three respondents in Sierra 
Leone, seventeen in Liberia, and fifteen in Côte d’Ivoire. In 2012, I con-
ducted field research in Senegal and interviewed twenty-one respondents. 
The respondents included diplomats, UN officials, NGO officials, govern-
ment officials, officials of opposition political parties, and community lead-
ers. Respondents were given consent forms and the options of maintaining 
complete or partial anonymity. Many respondents, especially diplomats, 
chose to remain anonymous.
The Variety of Non-State Actors and Their Dialectical Affinity  
with State Actors
In his study of climate change, Peter Newell used the terms non-govern-
mental and non-state actors interchangeably to ‘refer to actors that are not 
officially part of national government.’7 However, this definition does not 
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distinguish non-state actors involved in waging war from those involved in 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In terms of waging wars, non-state actors 
include the armed opposition and transnational corporations and net-
works involved in fighting, as well as in illicit trade of arms, minerals, and 
drugs.8 In the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, non-state actors 
largely refer to international NGOs working to provide humanitarian relief 
and promote post-war reconstruction.9 This ambiguity of what constitutes 
non-state actors persists in the literature on security, civil society and devel-
opment. The most vivid distinction in the literature is between armed non-
state actors waging wars and unarmed non-state actors working as civil 
society organizations. While the notion of armed non-state actors is well 
developed, there are critical gaps in conceptualizing civil (i.e. unarmed) 
non-state actors. Civil non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
have been largely reduced to international NGOs.
In her critique of sovereignty and security in the globalized world, Diane 
Davis identified a wide range of armed non-state actors who directly chal-
lenge state authority, tacitly undermine state authority, or clandestinely 
work for the state.10 They range from armed political movements seeking 
regime change to transnational criminal rings, community-based vigilan-
tes, and armed private security contractors. Davis argues that the variety of 
armed non-state actors not only challenges the “greed versus grievance” 
dichotomy, but also ‘signals the widespread transfer of security functions 
from the state to civil society.’11 In South-Eastern Afghanistan, for example, 
non-state actors filled the vacuum of state authority by performing com-
munity policing functions. The non-state actors included strongmen mili-
tia, criminal networks, private security contractors, Taliban insurgents, 
terrorist groups, and tribal police.12 One set of armed non-state actors that 
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has featured prominently in the peace and conflict literature are liberation 
and separatist movements. Such groups have increased in prominence to 
the point that their claims and relations to states is the subject of signifi-
cant debates in international law. Benedict Kingsbury identified three gen-
eral domains that are critical to the claims of liberation and separatist 
movements and their relation to states. These are self-determination, 
minority rights, and human rights.13 Using the Kosovar Albanians and the 
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh separatist movements as case studies, 
Anne-Marie Gardner argues that ‘the international community assesses a 
claimant group’s capacity for liberal democratic governance as a means to 
evaluating the group’s self-determination claim.’14 The issues of human 
rights and democratic practices point not only to the attempt to socialize 
armed non-state actors into international human rights norms, but also 
their dialectical relation to states. This dialectical relation is manifested in 
the friction between liberation and separatist movements’ claims to human 
rights and democracy and states’ efforts to hold them accountable for 
human rights and democracy. As Davis also notes, the relation between 
states and armed non-state actors is complicated by the issue of sover-
eignty.15 In some cases, states see armed non-state actors as a threat to 
authority, while in other cases they call upon armed non-state actors to 
help them reinforce and exert state authority.
Most of the civil society and development literature focuses on civil non-
state actors, especially international NGOs.16 As with armed non-state 
actors, civil non-state actors include a variety of organizations that are not 
entirely separated from the state. Moreover, civil non-state actors may 
include groups that do not neatly fall within the domain of civil society. 
Henry Carey argues that ‘The narrow view of NGOs holds that they only 
represent non-profit, service, and advocacy organizations in public affairs. 
Non-state actors (e.g., for-profit corporations or non-profit trade associa-
tions) and nationalist groups (e.g., violent terrorists and revolutionary cells) 
are excluded from this definition. An opposite conception of NGOs includes 
any association, liberal and civil or illiberal and uncivil, that is not part of 
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the government but influences society (excludes states and parties).’17 
Carey’s narrow view restricts the definition of non-state actors to NGOs 
that work within the realm of civil society to promote human rights and 
human development. Similarly, in this study we use the term civil non-state 
actors to refer to NGOs and ad hoc community organizations working to 
build peace in war-torn countries.
As with armed non-state actors, civil non-state actors have a dialectical 
relation with state actors. Civil non-state actors often find themselves 
dependent on states, while trying to maintain their autonomy and hold 
states accountable. Kendall Stiles captured this paradox in his notion of 
civil society empowerment, which brings together state and non-state 
actors in a way that seeks to move from state-centered development to citi-
zen participation.18 The key players in civil society empowerment are donor 
states, developing states, multilateral donor organizations, NGOs, and 
grassroots organizations. Mark Schuller presents a cynical view of this par-
adox through his notion of trickle-down imperialism. He sees NGOs as 
“semi-elites” who have inherited past world systems and pillars of contem-
porary globalization by ‘[m]ediating contacts between Northern donors 
and agencies and local communities in the South.’19 In contrast, Claudia 
Hofmann presents a positive angle to NGOs in peacekeeping and peace-
building; albeit it is limited to the sphere of human rights.20 She examines 
the way state actors and two international NGOs (i.e. Geneva Call and Save 
the Children-UK) engaged armed groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Liberia to combat the use of 
child soldiers and anti-personnel landmines. Hofmann argues that ‘non-
governmental organizations offer the potential to fill the gap in the interna-
tional legal regime by employing lower-key initiatives that avoid political 
issues such as the legitimization or recognition of non-state armed groups.’21 
She sees international NGOs as uniquely positioned to complement the 
work of state actors by using a “soft approach” that is more oriented toward 
problem-solving and policy.
Hofmann makes two important contributions that are relevant for this 
study. First, her work underscores the civil and positive role of non-state 
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actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Second, she sees the relation 
between non-state and state actors as a healthy collaboration that pro-
motes peace and protects civilians. Her work departs from both the armed 
non-state actors and the cynical civil non-state actors studies. Like many of 
the studies, however, Hofmann also reduces civil non-state actors in peace-
keeping and peacebuilding to international NGOs.22 This study expands 
her work in two ways. First, it examines the role of civil non-state actors 
in  other areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, most notably peace 
negotiations and delivery of services. Second, it identifies two other civil 
non-state actors (i.e. community-based NGOs and ad hoc community 
organizations ), in addition to international NGOs.
Variety of Civil Non-State Actors
The peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Côte d’Ivoire reveal three kinds of civil non-state actors that perform a 
wide range of activities to promote human security and human develop-
ment in war-torn countries: international NGOs, community-based NGOs, 
and ad hoc community organizations.
International NGOs are transnational corporate civil society organiza-
tions with a clearly defined mission, in most cases aimed at enhancing 
human security and human development. Their mission can focus on all 
persons – with organizations such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) or Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) – or a particular demo-
graphic group – with organizations such as Save the Children. The defining 
features of these kinds of civil non-state actors are their transnational and 
corporate characters. As Krishna Kumar notes, corporate NGOs have ‘large 
annual budgets, and managerial practices that are closer to corporations 
than to voluntary organisations. This […] kind of NGOs openly competes 
with the state and frequently asserts that the latter is redundant, so it might 
as well reconcile to handing over its responsibilities, especially those per-
taining to the education and health of the poor.’23 Sangeeta Kamat refers to 
these kinds of civil non-state actors as advocacy NGOs. As she notes, 
‘Advocacy NGOs do not operate locally, that is, they do not represent a par-
ticular geographically defined community. Rather they tend to be issue 
22) Hofmann, ‘Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action’.
23) Krishna Kumar, ‘Partners in Education’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 43, no. 3, 2008, 
p. 9.
<UN> <UN>
 A.B. Bah / Journal of International Peacekeeping 17 (2013) 313–336 321
24) Sangeeta Kamat, ‘The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a 
Neoliberal Era’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, p. 161.
25) Kamat, ‘The Privatization of Public Interest’, pp. 159-160.
26) Campaign for Good Governance Organizational Profile, http://www.slcgg.org/aboutCGG 
.html, accessed 14 September 2012.
based and the constituency they represent may encompass different 
regions and countries. […] Also, in comparison to [community-based 
organisations] CBOs, advocacy NGOs are better funded, professionally 
staffed and are housed in metropolitan centres such as Washington DC or 
New Delhi.’24
Community-based NGOs are registered civil society organizations with a 
clearly stated mission to promote human security and human develop-
ment and a formal leadership and management structure. In contrast to 
international NGOs, community-based NGOs operate at the local or 
national levels. Moreover, they are small both in terms of budget and staff. 
Such organizations include Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) in 
Sierra Leone, Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme (LIDH), and the 
Liberian Council of Churches (LCC). While community-based NGOs have 
missions and stated objectives, they are mostly defined by the activities 
they carry out. As such, community-based NGOs typically have a member-
ship base and clear beneficiary group who actively participate in their 
activities. As Kamat argues, community-based NGOs ‘interact with their 
membership base on a daily basis, to build relations of cooperation and 
trust with them, to understand their needs and plan projects that respond 
to these needs. Consequently, CBOs tend to have close and intimate work-
ing relations with men and women of the community and local leaders, 
some of whom may also work as paid staff for the NGO.’25 However, 
community-based NGOs typically depend on international NGOs, foreign 
governments, and national governments for funding. Most of their funding 
comes in the form of contracts and grants to implement specific projects to 
enhance human development. As the CGG states, for example, the organi-
zation ‘works with key partners including international NGOs and govern-
ment departments such as the police to effectively deliver programs […] 
and is funded extensively by a number of international bodies.’26
Ad hoc community organizations are informal groups established by 
local or national leaders to address a specific urgent problem within a com-
munity or the country at large. Their membership tends to be selective, but 
fairly representative of the collective will of the people. They are temporary 
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bodies that may or may not evolve into a community-based NGO. Ad hoc 
community organizations engage in troubleshooting rather than program 
implementation. They rely heavily on the cultural and social capital of the 
members to accomplish their tasks. While most ad hoc community organi-
zations are established to address local problems (sanitation, family feuds, 
water management, etc.) there are a few that address national issues. Ad 
hoc community organizations at the national level tend to emerge during 
times of major national crisis such as civil war. National ad hoc community 
organizations such as the Inter-Religious Council and the Mano River 
Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET) were pivotal in helping negotiate 
peace agreements in Sierra Leone and Liberia.27 At the local level, ad hoc 
community organizations have also been critical in helping peacekeepers 
and humanitarian aid workers negotiate with low-ranking battlefield com-
manders who control critical access roads to civilians trapped by fighting. 
While ad hoc community organizations operating at the village and town 
levels may not have direct impacts on peace mediation, they provide criti-
cal help to peacekeepers and humanitarian workers on the ground.28
Civil Non-State Actors in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire
All three types of civil non-state actors played a significant role in the 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte 
d’Ivoire. A search of four international databases and directories of NGOs 
and one national directory for Sierra Leone and Liberia revealed the exist-
ence of over 630 NGOs in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. 
Collectively, the databases and directories listed 300 NGOs in Sierra Leone, 
154 in Liberia and 180 in Côte d’Ivoire.29 The organizations listed include 
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major international NGOs such as ICRC, MSF, Amnesty International, and 
the Norwegian Refugee Council. There was also a wide array of community-
based NGOs such as CGG, Fifty-Fifty Group, and National Forum for Human 
Rights in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, the community-based NGOs included the 
Interfaith Council of Liberia and LCC. Some of the notable community-
based NGOs in Côte d’Ivoire include the Forum of African Civil Society for 
Sustainable Development, the Collective of Civil Society for Peace, and 
LIDH. Many of the community-based NGOs in all three countries emerged 
during the civil war periods. While some of the international NGOs had 
presence in all three countries before the outbreak of the civil wars, inter-
national NGOs also became heavily involved in these countries during the 
civil wars.30 The databases clearly delineated international NGOs from 
community-based NGOs. Though the databases and directories seem 
exhaustive, they mostly list formally registered organizations which suggest 
that ad hoc community organizations that emerged during the war periods 
were not listed unless they later became NGOs.
Field research in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire also revealed 
the existence of important ad hoc community organizations that emerged 
during the civil wars. These organizations include high profile ad hoc com-
mittees of religious and national elders and women’s groups that played 
critical roles in facilitating peace negotiations between the governments 
and opposition forces. Though most of these were temporary and informal 
bodies, they played critical roles in facilitating peacekeeping. Some of the 
most notable ad hoc community organizations include the Inter-Religious 
Council in Sierra Leone, the Collective of Religious Confessions for National 
Reconciliation and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire, the Inter-Religious Council in 
Liberia, and MARWOPNET.
Dialectical Affinity between Civil Non-State Actors and State Actors
As both the armed non-state actors and civil non-state actors literature 
show, non-state and state actors are dialectically connected. A proper con-
cept of civil non-state actors requires not only expanding the notion from 
international NGOs to encompass community-based NGOs and ad hoc 
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community organizations, but also examining the complementarity and 
contradictions between civil non-state actors and state actors. This dialecti-
cal affinity is largely tied to the differences and similarities in the mandates, 
values, and interests of state actors and civil non-state actors.
In terms of mandate, civil non-state actors are fundamentally different 
from state actors. This stems from the fact that states are sovereign entities 
within the international system with the responsibility to maintain order 
within their boundaries and the right to protect themselves against exter-
nal threats.31 This sovereignty is only tempered with the obligations to 
respect the sovereignty of other states and international conventions and 
accept international humanitarian intervention in cases of extraordinary 
situations that significantly undermine human security and regional or 
world peace.32 In the context of peacekeeping, state actors acquire the 
authority to exert power over people in a war-torn country as defined by the 
mandate given to them by the states or intergovernmental organization 
they represent. Such powers can include the right to control the movement 
of people and goods, detain people, and use force. In Sierra Leone, for 
example, UN Security Council resolution 1289 of February 2000 empowered 
peacekeepers to provide security and control the flow of people and goods. 
In Liberia, UN peacekeepers were empowered ‘to apprehend and detain 
former President Charles Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to 
transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution before 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to keep the Liberian Government, 
the Sierra Leonean Government and the Council fully informed.’33 In addi-
tion to their mandates, state actors, especially major countries, can deploy 
significant financial and military resources to increase their powers.
In contrast, civil non-state actors are voluntary bodies that operate 
within the global and domestic civil society domain. They have no jurisdic-
tion over the people they seek to help. However, civil non-state actors 
possess financial, moral, and social capital which gives them a significant 
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amount of influence in war-torn countries.34 By controlling the distribu-
tion of food and medicine, for example, international NGOs exerted influ-
ence on the movement of people in Sierra Leone and Liberia. NGOs can 
also shame people suspected of war crimes or impeding peace and thereby 
force state actors to place them under international sanctions (travel bans, 
freezing assets, etc.) or indict them for war crimes.35 This is clearly the case 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia where a virtual consensus developed in the civil 
society community that Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), and former Liberian president Charles Taylor were impeding 
peace.36 Both of these men were placed under international sanctions and 
ultimately arrested for war crimes. Such actions could have hardly occurred 
without the moral support of civil non-state actors. Though state and civil 
non-state actors have different claims to authority, they both have some 
power in affecting conditions in war-torn countries. States have political 
and military power, while civil non-state actors possess deep cultural and 
social capitals, which are needed to effect humanitarian relief and move 
peace processes forward. The emotional pressure women’s groups exerted 
on warlords during the 2003 Liberian peace talks in Accra is an example of 
the cultural capital of civil non-state actors. Because state and civil non-
state actors tend to bring different kinds of capital and power in peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding, they often work in partnership to promote shared 
humanitarian objectives.37
In terms of values, state and civil non-state actors often refer to common 
notions of security, human rights, and democracy. States, especially Western 
powers, see these values as part of their democratic political culture and 
international human rights conventions. Similarly, NGOs have missions 
which are predicated on peace, democracy, and human rights. However, 
state and civil non-state actors have nuanced understandings of these com-
mon values and pursue them according to their own interests. States have 
typically approached international peacekeeping and peacebuilding from 
the perspective of regional and international security and compliance 
with international norms on democratic governance and human rights.38 
These values are interpreted in-line with historical and ideological ties and 
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strategic economic and political interests. States have consistently tied 
peacekeeping operations to the need to maintain regional security and 
implement multiparty elections. In all three West African cases, the 
ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping missions were largely seen as ways to main-
tain security in a region that was experiencing growing political turmoil. 
The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 was initiated by Nigeria as 
soon as the war began in part because Nigerian dictator Ibrahim Babangida 
saw the civil war as a security threat to dictatorial regimes in the region.39 
In Côte d’Ivoire too, the 2003 ECOWAS intervention was largely driven by 
the desire to halt the growing regional insecurity. Similarly, the peacekeep-
ing operations in these countries were anchored in the efforts to join the 
democracy bandwagon. In Sierra Leone, for example, Nigerian dictator 
Sani Abacha became a staunch supporter of the military intervention to 
restore the democratically elected president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, ousted 
from power by the military and rebel forces in 1997. Though Abacha was 
suppressing democracy at home, Sierra Leone became an opportunity for 
him to present himself as a champion of democracy. Most importantly, the 
peacekeeping missions in all three countries were centred on multiparty 
elections as stipulated in the various peace agreements.40 The emphasis on 
multiparty elections dovetails with the international demand for democ-
racy in Africa, which began in the early 1990s.41
In contrast to state actors’ focus on regional security and democracy, civil 
non-state actors approach peacekeeping and peacebuilding from the much 
broader human security and human development perspectives instead of 
mere state or regional security. Civil non-state actors seek not only to pro-
mote democracy, but more importantly to provide humanitarian relief, 
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prosecute human rights abuses and promote human development during 
the post-war period.42 They approach peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
more as a human security, rather than a state security issue. While states 
are wedded into the legal and security aspects of world order, civil non-
state actors champion humanism and social justice. These values are 
reflected in their missions and the kinds of activities they promote. The 
ICRC, for example, states that it ‘is an impartial, neutral and independent 
organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives 
and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence 
and to provide them with assistance.’ Moreover, ‘the ICRC also endeavours 
to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and 
universal humanitarian principles.’43 Though the plethora of civil non-state 
actors all tend to focus on a narrow aspect of political and social rights (ref-
ugees, health, women’s rights, etc.), collectively their works span all dimen-
sions of human security and human development.
Finally, both state and civil non-state actors have strategic interests that 
they must preserve as they engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
States have a clear self-interest in ensuring security within their territories. 
As such, any conflict that threatens their own internal order becomes a 
matter of significant interest to them. The most typical forms of security 
threats from war-torn countries are the flow of arms and combatants, state 
collapse and the possibility of creating safe havens for terrorists, and mas-
sive flow of refugees.44 Apart from security interests, states may have strate-
gic economic and geopolitical interests in war-torn countries that they 
need to protect.45 In each of the three countries under consideration, the 
former colonial power played major roles in the international interven-
tions. Britain pushed for significant UN involvement and deployed troops 
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in Sierra Leone in May 2000, while France did the same in Côte d’Ivoire. In 
November 2004 and early 2011, for example, French forces directly engaged 
in fighting with forces loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo. In Liberia, 
the United States deployed troops in August 2003 to provide logistical sup-
port to ECOMOG and protect civilians during one of the most critical 
points in the peacekeeping operation.
Civil non-state actors too have strategic interests in the survival and 
growth of their organizations. As social entrepreneurs, NGOs must con-
stantly raise money to cover their operational and program costs. NGOs not 
only seek to do good, but also to ensure their own material wellbeing by 
doing good.46 While doing good and living off good are not mutually exclu-
sive, the symbiosis between the two leaves critical questions about the 
operations of civil non-state actors and their impact on peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. Civil non-state actors have two mutually reinforcing inter-
ests. First is the need to be seen as doers of good. This not only provides a 
justification for their existence, but also provides an argument for contin-
ued financial support from donors. Second is the need to maintain opera-
tional capacity and growth of their organizations. This requires them 
to constantly seek funding from donors and undertake new projects. 
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations provide opportunities for 
NGOs to be seeing as doing good and grow.47
Notwithstanding their differences, state and civil non-state actors have 
overlapping features which draw them into peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing. They both have some common human rights and humanitarian values, 
strategic interests in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the ability to 
exert power in war-torn countries. These commonalities and divergences 
are manifested in a dialectical affinity that simultaneously requires collab-
oration and boundary maintenance.
Because of states’ unique position of authority and ability to use military 
force, civil non-state actors sometimes need the support of state actors 
in order to broadly deliver humanitarian relief. This kind of collaboration is 
often manifested in efforts such as securing humanitarian corridors, 
escorting humanitarian convoys, guarding refugee camps, and protecting 
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warehouses.48 Yet, this collaboration may also mask some of the differences 
between state and civil non-state actors in terms of treatment of civilians 
(especially women) and suspected combatants, priority places for provid-
ing humanitarian relief, target populations, and duration of operations. In 
a similar way, state actors often count on civil non-state actors in order to 
establish contacts with opposition combatants and commanders, over-
come impasses in peace mediation, provide cultural knowledge and up-to-
date accounts of situations on the ground, and implement humanitarian 
relief projects. To the extent that state actors also see security in terms of 
human development, they often provide financial support to NGOs. For 
states, NGOs may provide a better alternative for channelling humanitarian 
assistance instead of handing over resources to governments which are 
either engaged in war, lack legitimacy, or incapable of effective implemen-
tations. Thus, while state actors enable civil non-state action, civil non-
state actors also facilitate the implementation of the missions and policies 
of state actors.
Activities of Civil Non-State Actors in War-Torn Countries
War-torn countries typically face three major challenges: alleviating 
humanitarian suffering, negotiating and implementing a durable peace 
agreement, and post-war reconstruction.49 State and civil non-state actors 
address these challenges by establishing peacekeeping missions, pursuing 
peace negotiations, and supporting post-war reconstruction programs. 
Civil non-state actors not only complemented the works of state actors, but 
they also played critical problem-solving roles that were vital for the peace-
keeping and peacebuilding operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte 
d’Ivoire. The extant literature has not only failed to adequately conceptual-
ize the variety of civil non-state actors, but it has also left out or underval-
ued some of their contributions to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.50
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The first challenge of alleviating humanitarian suffering typically trig-
gers peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping includes both military and 
civilian activities aimed at creating conditions for delivering humanitarian 
assistance, protecting civilians, and implementing ceasefire or peace agree-
ments. It revolves around formally established military and civilian opera-
tions, such as the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Peacekeeping mis-
sions are internationally authorized military operations with defined polit-
ical, security and humanitarian objectives undertaken by military personnel 
with the support of a more or less important professional civilian staff. 
While the security aspect of peacekeeping is exclusively undertaken by 
state actors (i.e. military and police forces), the humanitarian dimension of 
peacekeeping is undertaken by state actors (i.e. civilian staff of states and 
intergovernmental organizations) and civil non-state actors. Because of 
their access to resources and operational infrastructure, international 
NGOs have been the main civil non-state actors in the delivery of humani-
tarian relief and advocacy against war crimes. International NGOs often 
work with community-based NGOs and ad hoc community organizations 
at the local level to reach victims and provide critical supplies such as water, 
food and medicine. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, MSF and the 
ICRC delivered huge supplies of medicines during the war, operated numer-
ous mobile clinics, and provided critical services in public hospitals. Back 
in February and March 1998, MSF carried out 960 surgical interventions at 
Connaught hospital in Freetown. It also had a surgeon at Netlands hospital 
and provided basic health services for around 12,000 refuges at the national 
stadium in Freetown. In Kambia district, it deployed a medical team, which 
provided medical and nutritional services for approximately 15,000.51
The second challenge of negotiating and implementing a peace agree-
ment is largely addressed through formal peace mediations led by state-
actors. At the outset of civil wars, states and intergovernmental bodies 
initiate a mediation process to get the warring parties to resolve their differ-
ences peacefully. The scope and vigour of these mediation efforts largely 
depend on the intensity of the conflict and the extent to which other states, 
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especially the major powers, are vested in the country. In Côte d’Ivoire, for 
example, France quickly initiated a peace process leading to the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement in 2003. Though the agreement was fundamentally 
flawed, it is an example of quick action by a vested power. In Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, it took several years for the peace processes to really develop. 
Liberia signed its first substantive peace agreement in 1993 in Cotonou, 
while Sierra Leone reached its first agreement in 1996 in Abidjan. As all 
three countries show, state actors often find it difficult to resolve civil wars 
in a timely manner. Too often, the peace mediation processes drag on as 
violence escalates. Moreover, peace mediation processes are plagued by 
repeated violations and collapse of peace agreements and stalemates in 
negotiating new agreements.52
Though civil non-state actors are not formal members of the peace med-
itation processes, international NGOs and ad hoc community-based organ-
izations play critical roles in establishing contacts with opposition fighters 
and diffusing stalemates in peace negotiations and implementation at both 
the national and battlefield levels. In Sierra Leone, for example, the ICRC 
made the first public radio contact with Sankoh, the RUF leader, and pro-
vided the helicopter that transported him from his base to Abidjan for the 
1996 peace talks.53 Similarly, when RUF rebels abducted huge numbers of 
civilians and refused to negotiate during the January 1999 invasion of 
Freetown, ECOMOG resorted to religious leaders to help negotiate with 
rebel commanders for a ceasefire and the release of abducted civilians. At 
the request of the ECOMOG commander, the religious leaders went to the 
RUF base and convinced the commanders to release the abducted children. 
As one of the clergymen who participated in the negotiations recalled:
[…] the late Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe […] wanted to talk with the rebel com-
manders […] we had a meeting with the rebels […] they were able to release about 
thirty-two children they abducted in Freetown and on the way. They released them to 
me and I took them back to the ECOMOG checkpoint. And so I handed over those 
children. Then, I joined my colleagues into the bush and the large number of rebels.
[…] We sat down and we talked. […] they accepted that they had done some bad things 
and were willing to apologize to the people for their actions personally, to express their 
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deepest regrets for what they have done, especially burning some of the strategic 
buildings in the city.54
The contacts between the religious leaders and the RUF rebels later evolved 
to include discussions with the RUF leader. They convinced Sankoh to agree 
to compressive peace talks. As the clergyman further stated, ‘we went to 
President Kabbah and we told him [that Sankoh has agreed to holding 
peace talks]. […] We convinced Foday Sankoh, out of the several meetings 
we had, for a roundtable peace talks. He accepted that. He convinced his 
commandos. The only problem that was a real issue was the venue [for the 
peace talks].’55
In Liberia an ad hoc group of women went to the 2003 Accra peace talks 
to pressure the warlords to reach a peace agreement, even though they 
were not invited to the talks. The women used cultural and psychological 
pressures to force the warlords to continue the negotiation until they ended 
the stalemate. As one female community leader recalled about the Accra 
peace talks:
We decided that we are not just going to stay in Liberia, but we’ll send a delegation to 
Ghana; and that delegation went and mobilized Liberian women on the [refugee] 
camps – even women from the Northern region in Ghana joined the process and they 
were there mounting pressure […]. In terms of negotiating or engaging with stakehold-
ers, we told them what we wanted, for example, peaceful dialogue […]. And after the 
peace talks, we wanted unconditional ceasefire in this country; the third thing we 
wanted was the coming of an intervention force.56
The implementation of peace agreements, including the first post-war elec-
tions, is undertaken primarily by state actors and the parties to the conflict 
(including the armed non-state actors). However, civil non-state actors play 
significant roles in educating citizens about elections and ensuring the 
transparency and integrity of elections. In particular, community-based 
NGOs implement a variety of programs to educate and register voters. 
Moreover, they act as election observers and provide a critical voice in lend-
ing credibility to election results. In Sierra Leone, for example, community-
based NGOs, such as CGG, pushed for the 1996 elections and provided 
critical social and moral support to the Independent Electoral Commission, 
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which organized the elections against the will of the military government.57 
Civil non-state actors also serve as a moral voice that exposes violations of 
peace agreements and those forces that impede the peace process.
The final challenge is post-war reconstruction, which is an essential 
component of peacebuilding. Given the underlying political and economic 
roots of civil wars in Africa, post-war reconstruction typically centres on 
promoting democracy, good governance and economic development.58 
Post-war reconstruction dovetails with the efforts to promote human devel-
opment, which is the processes of increasing people’s material, social and 
political wellbeing.59 Most of the funding for post-war reconstruction in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire comes from donor countries and 
international development institutions, most notably UN agencies, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All three coun-
tries have been working with these institutions through the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Framework.60
Though post-war reconstruction policies and funding are driven by state 
actors, especially the IMF, the World Bank and former colonial powers, 
implementation of post-war reconstruction programs at the local level are 
mostly carried out by civil non-state actors, especially community-based 
NGOs and international NGOs.61 Community-based NGOs receive grants 
and contracts to implement specific projects especially in the area of edu-
cation, health, agriculture, and human rights. In Sierra Leone, for example, 
most of the post-war reconstruction funds given to the National Commission 
for Social Action (NaCSA) were passed to community-based NGOs in the 
form of small grants to implement micro level development projects. 
NaCSA gave out around 600 grants to community-based NGOs.62 
International NGOs also tend to stay in post-war countries and redirect 
their programs from relief work to human development. Since the end of 
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the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002, for example, Plan International has 
redirected its programs to support schools in the neediest communities. 
This fits into the wider focus on education as a way to enhance human 
development. Plan International’s Making Schools Fit for Children pro-
gram, for example, seeks to provide ‘sufficient classroom space and durable 
child furniture, with plenty of school books and materials, to ensure child-
friendly learning environments.’63 It lobbies for raising the national educa-
tion budget, increasing the number of qualified teachers, and equal access 
to education. In Liberia, Mercy Corps has been working with the Liberia 
Produce Marketing Corporation and local farmers to rehabilitate an 80-acre 
cocoa farm. The program is designed to increase the cocoa cultivation tech-
niques of farmers and help them ‘earn cash by working to clear the over-
growth that accumulated during the war years and strangled the cocoa 
trees.’64 In 2011, the Open Society Initiative in West Africa partnered with 
the Commission Dialogue, Vérité et Réconciliation to promote a transitional 
justice program in Côte d’Ivoire. In the same year, it worked with the LIDH 
to promote a human rights program based on capacity-building and advo-
cacy.65 While these are a few examples of the efforts to build peace, they 
show that civil non-state actors are playing critical roles in the effort to pro-
mote human development and thereby consolidate the peace.
Conclusions: Impacts and Limitations of Civil Non-State Actors
The role of civil non-state actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding has 
not received adequate scholarly attention. As this study shows, however, 
civil non-state actors have played important and delicate roles in peace-
keeping operations and the overall peacebuilding process in war-torn West 
African countries. The three case studies, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte 
d’Ivoire, point to several instances where civil non-state actors have com-
plemented the role of state actors by moving peace processes forward and 
delivering humanitarian services. This study points to several lessons that 
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are useful for understanding the variety of civil non-state actors and their 
contributions to peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
The first lesson centers on the fluidity of the category of non-state actors 
and the need for a more precise conceptualization of the variety of unarmed 
non-state actors working within the realm of civil society to promote peace 
and human development in war-torn countries. The extant notions of state 
actors and non-state actors create a misleading bifurcation in the way we 
view the various actors involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This 
bifurcation not only lacks clarity, but also masks the interconnections 
among state actors and non-state actors working to promote peace and 
human development in war-torn countries. This study has developed the 
notion of civil non-state actors to map the variety of civil society organiza-
tions promoting peace and human development in war-torn countries. 
Moreover, the notion of civil non-state actors unmasks the dialectical affin-
ity between state actors and civil society organizations involved in peace-
keeping and peacebuilding.
The second lesson shows the critical and complementary role of civil 
non-state actors in advancing peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. 
This positive contribution of civil non-state actors is largely due to their 
strong values for human security and human development, cultural and 
social capital, and adaptive capacity. Though civil non-state actors could 
hardly operate without the security protection offered by formal peace-
keeping missions, civil non-state actors play independent roles in the 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding process. Most importantly, they bring cul-
tural and social capital, which state actors can draw upon when they 
encounter stalemates or simply do not know how to reach critical actors on 
the battlefield. The positive contribution of civil non-state actors also 
results from their belief in the values of human security and human devel-
opment. These values largely account for the risk they take in reaching peo-
ple in the most remote areas of war-torn countries and their decisions to 
stay in those countries for as long as possible. Though civil non-state actors 
lack military or political mandates, their values give them significant moral 
influence which sets them apart from state actors, who are often perceived 
by the warring factions as harboring imperialistic geopolitical agendas. 
Furthermore, civil non-state actors have a large degree of flexibility in their 
decision to operate in war-torn countries. This is in part because they do 
not have to follow strict political and legal procedures in order to do their 
work, such as getting parliamentary approval or a UN Security Council 
mandate.
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The third lesson relates to the dependency of civil non-state actors. 
Though the financial dependency of domestic NGOs on international 
NGOs and states is widely known, the subtle dependency of civil non-state 
actors on state actors is masked in their dialectical relation. To some extent, 
the ability of civil non-state actors to operate in war-torn countries is influ-
enced by the presence of a peacekeeping mission, which would provide 
minimal levels of security and give security advices. Though civil non-state 
actors sometimes work in frontlines, even in the absence of a peacekeeping 
mission, their activities tend to be very minimal in such instances. The 
deployment of peacekeeping missions gives a sense of reasonable security 
for civil non-state actors to fully deploy staff and resources. In addition to 
the physical security dependency, civil non-state actors also depend on 
state actors to undertake the legal and political actions to support their 
peacebuilding efforts. In particular, civil non-state actors need states to 
issue binding resolutions which they can invoke in their work. Moreover, 
they also need states to take concrete actions, such as arms embargos and 
threat of prosecution, to hinder the abilities of the warring factions to wage 
war. In the absence of a peacekeeping mission and the active involvement 
of state actors, civil non-state actors could only undertake a limited set of 
activities to help civilians and promote peace.
The final lesson points to the ad hoc and short term nature of many of 
the activities of civil non-state actors. International peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding gravitates toward humanitarian and security emergencies. 
As such, the natural tendency of both state actors and civil non-state actors 
is to put their resources in areas where there is an urgent humanitarian 
need. This emergency response approach persists despite repeated efforts 
to engage in conflict prevention and emergency preparedness. This reality 
is often reflected in the way international NGOs flood new conflicts areas 
and how they drawdown from old conflict areas as new humanitarian cri-
ses emerge in the international arena. The nature of funding for NGOs, 
which is largely based on grants and contracts for project implementation, 
also makes it hard to engage in comprehensive postwar reconstruction 
efforts. This is compounded by the lack of proper coordination among civil 
non-state actors. In many cases, projects are duplicated in some areas, 
while other places are neglected. Moreover, there is hardly sufficient plan-
ning for maintenance and continuity after the program period ends. While 
it is true that most of the work of civil non-state actors is to provide human-
itarian relief, it is difficult to engage in effective peacebuilding without 
making a meaningful impact on human development.
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